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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Kane County Hospital (the "Hospital") 1 agrees that Utah Code section 78A-4-
103(2)(a) grants the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over final orders or decrees 
resulting from a formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency. 
But Ramsay and Smalling's brief strays from that grant of jurisdiction. On appeal, 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review only the "final agency action" itself. See, 
e.g., BMS 1999, Inc. v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2014 UT App 111, 15 n.2, 327 P.3d 
Ii 578. Thus, to the extent Ramsay and Smalling ask the Court to do more than review the 
Retirement Board's final agency action-by, for example, addressing the merits of the 
underlying dispute when the action was based solely on limitations grounds-Ramsay 
~ and Smalling ask the Court to venture outside the jurisdiction granted by section 78A-4-
l 03(2)(a). The Court should decline that invitation. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. A three-year statute of limitations applies to Ramsay and Smalling's state-
retirement-benefit claims against the Hospital. This limitations period may be equitably 
tolled only upon the belated discovery of the facts fonning the basis of the cause of 
action. Ramsay and Smalling knew about the single fact underlying their claim to state 
retirement benefits-the Hospital's provision of a 40l(k) plan-for almost 15 years 
before they intervened in the administrative action. Did the Retirement Board err when it 
found that Ramsay and Smalling were not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations 
period? 
1 Appellants refer to the Hospital in their opening brief, including its caption, as the Kane 
County Human Resources Special Service District. However, during the administrative 
action that is the subject of this appeal, the Hospital was identified as the "Kane County 
Hospital." Thus, to be consistent with the proceeding below, the Hospital uses that name 
in its caption and in this brief. 
I 
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The Retirement Board's decision about the statute of limitations is the only issue 
properly before this Court on appeal. Nevertheless, Ramsay and Smalling attempt to raise 
the following three additional issues on appeal: 
( 1) Does the statutory discovery rule in the Governmental Immunity Act apply? 
(2) Has their retirement benefit claim against the Hospital accrued? 
(3) Is the Hospital liable under the Retirement Act? 
For the reasons stated below, the Court should not ~each these three additional issues. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The central issue on appeal is the application of the equitable discovery rule. The 
"applicability of ... the discovery rule" is a question of law. See Colosimo v. Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, iJ 11, 156 P .3d 806. Thus, the Court of 
Appeals should review for correctness the Retirement Board's order dismissing Ramsay 
and Smalling's claims as time-barred. See id. 
For the first time on appeal, Ramsay and Smalling urge the Court to apply a 
statutory discovery rule found in the Governmental Immunity Act. Ramsay and Smalling 
failed to preserve this argument, and their opening brief does not argue plain error or 
exceptional circumstances. Therefore, no standard of review applies here-the Court 
simply should not address this unpreserved issue. See State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, il 24, 
282 P.3d 985; see also Marcroft v. Labor Comm 'n, 2015 UT App 174, ,r 4,356 P.3d 164. 
The same is true of Ramsay and Smalling' s final two arguments. They fail to either 
appropriately assign error or meet their burden of persuasion on their accrual argument, 
and the Retirement Board expressly left their argument seeking interpretation of the 
Retirement Act unaddressed below. Again, no standard of review applies to these 
arguments-the accrual argument has not been properly raised on appeal, and if the 
2 
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Retirement Act-interpretation argument needs to be reached, the Court of Appeals should 
remand to permit the Retirement Board to do so. 
DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
The Hospital agrees that Utah Code section 78B-2-305( 4) is of "central 
importance," as it provides the applicable statute of limitations. 
Utah Code§ 78B-2-305(4)-Statutes of Limitations, 
Other than Real Property, Within Three Years 
An action may be brought within three years ... for liability created by the 
statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of 
this state, except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by 
the statutes of this state. 
Utah Code section 49-13-202 is part of the Utah State Retirement and Insurance 
Benefit Act (the "Retirement Act"). The Retirement Act provides context and 
background, but the interpretation and application of that statute is beyond the scope of 
<, this appeal. 
Utah Code section 63 G-7-40 I-part of the Governmental Immunity Act-was not 
raised below, and Ramsay and Smalling have failed to argue that either plain error or 
@ exceptional circumstances justify its consideration on appeal. That statute is thus outside 
the scope of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Tlte Hospital's 401 (k) Retirement Plan and tlte Uta/z Retirement Systems 
In 1993, on the advice of its insurance professionals, Kane County Hospital (the 
"Hospital) began offering a 401(k) retirement benefit to its employees. (R. 32, 561.) Lori 
Ramsay and Dan Smalling, intervenors in the underlying administrative action, are 
3 
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employees of.the Hospital who have received 401(k) ben~fits_.2 (R. 561.) Ramsay began 
her participation in the Hospital's 40l(k) plan on January 1, 1994. (Id) Smalling began ~ 
his participation in the Hospital's 40l(k) plan on October 7, 1995. (Id.) 
On January 5, 2007, Ramsay made an inquiry to the Utah State Retirement Board 
("Retirement Board" or "Board") concerning employee benefits in the Utah Retirement 
Systems ("URS"). (R. 13-14, 561.) The Board sent Ramsay a letter with the information 
Ramsay had requested and a copy of a Retirement New Group Questionnaire, which 
Ramsay provided to the Hospital. (Id.) The purpose of this Questionnaire is to determine 
eligibility for a public employer to participate in the URS. (Id at 561.) On January 22, 
2007, the Hospital completed the Retirement New Group Questionnaire, which identifies 
its 40l(k) plan, and returned it to the Retirement Board. (Id. at 16-18, 562.) On February 
12, 2007, the Board informed the Hospital for the first time that it was allegedly required 
by the Utah State Retirement Act, U.C.A. § 49-13-202 (the "Retirement Act"), to 
participate in URS because it had provided a 401(k) benefit to its employees. (Id. at 4, 25, 
562.) The Board's notice provides that .the Hospital's participation in URS was still 
subject to completion of an application and a resolution from the Hospital's governing 
body requesting admission in URS. (Id. at 25.) There is no evidence in the record that the 
Hospital knew about any possible requirement that it must provide state retirement 
benefits through URS prior to its receipt of the February 12, 2007 notice from the Board. 
(R. 32, 424-25, 637.) 
In August 2008, the Board demanded that the Hospital pay contributions to URS 
on behalf of all of its employees from 1993 and indefinitely moving forward. (Id. at 4.) 
However, because the Hospital denied liability under the Retirement Act (and because it 
2 On occasion, this brief refers to Ramsay and Smalling collectively as "the Intervenors." 
4 
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lacked the funds demanded by the Board), the Hospital declined to make retrospective or . 
prospective contributions to URS on behalf of its employees. (Id. at 4, 562.) On April 30, 
2009, in an effort to mitigate this potential liability, and pursuant to legislation passed by 
the Utah State Legislature in the 2009 General Legislative Session, the Hospital's Board 
'1 of Directors approved a resolution to irrevocably elect nonparticipation in URS. (Id.) 
Tlte Retirement Board's Action and Ramsay and Smalling's Intervention 
On August 11, 2009, the Retirement Board initiated the underlying administrative 
~ proceeding by filing a Notice of Board Action against the Hospital. (R. 2-10.) The Board 
alleged that under the Retirement Act the Hospital became a participant in URS the 
moment it offered a 401 (k) retirement benefit to its employees. (Id. at 5-7.) The Board 
@ sought an order requiring the Hospital to pay alleged delinquent URS retirement 
contributions to the Board on behalf of all of its employees from 1993 (when the 401(k) 
benefit was first offered to Hospital employees) to April 30, 2009 (when the Hospital 
@ elected nonparticipation in URS). (Id. at 9.) On October 12, 2009, the Hospital answered 
the Notice of Board Action and denied all alleged liability. (Id. at 30-41.) 
On December 16, 2009, Ramsay and Smalling filed a lawsuit in the Third Judicial 
District Court against the Board, the Hospital, and the Hospital's insurance advisors-
John Hancock Life Insurance Company and Dean Johnson-seeking funding for URS 
benefits. (R. 47-59.) Each of these defendants moved to dismiss this lawsuit because, 
among other reasons, Ramsay and Smalling had failed to exhaust their administrative 
remedies by not pursuing their claim for funding of URS benefits before the Retirement 
Board. The district court granted the motions to dismiss, which decision was ultimately 
affinned by the Utah Supreme Court. See Ramsay v. Kane County Human Res. Special 
Serv. Dist., 2014 UT 5, 322 P.3d 1163. 
5 
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On MarGh 31, 2010, Ramsay and Smalling fil~d their Motion to Intervene in this 
case. (R. 43-44.) In support of this motion, Ramsay and Smalling described this dispute 
as "one that involves legal issues of whether [the Hospital] is required to fund the 
retirement benefits for Ramsay and Smalling at the minimum levels required under the 
[Retirement Act]." (R. 78) ( ~mphasis added). Thus, at least at this time, Ramsay and 
Smalling recognized that the Hospital's alleged liability under the Retirement Act is a 
question of law and not fact. On August 18, 2010, the Board's Hearing Officer granted 
the Motion to Intervene. (R. 98.) 
Partial Summary Judgment Against tlte Board 
On March 1, 2013, the Hospital filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
seeking a judgment that the Retirement Board's claim against the Hospital was limited by 
the applicable three-year statute of limitations. (R. 266-67.) Specifically, the Hospital 
sought a summary judgment that the Board could only look to recover URS contributions 
from the Hospital for the period between August 11, 2006 (three years before the Notice 
of Board Action was filed) and April 30, 2009 (when the Hospital opted out of any 
claimed requirement that it participate in URS). (Id.) The Board opposed this Motion. (R. 
327-70.) Additionally, although the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was expressly 
limited to the Board's claim, Ramsay and Smalling also opposed this Motion. (R. 371-
98.) The Retirement Board, along with Ramsay and Smalling, argued that the limitations 
period should be equitably tolled under a concealment theory because the Hospital did 
not make reports and did not pay contributions to the Board that were allegedly required 
by the Retirement Act. (R. 338, 372.) However, the Board and Ramsay and Smalling 
failed to come forward with evidence that the _Hospital was aware of such alleged 
statutory reporting and payment requirements. (R. 424-25.) 
6 
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Ramsay and Smalling also argued that, as applied to them, the statute of limitations 
should be tolled because they "had no knowledge of, nor reasonable opportunity to 
discover, the legal analysis that suggests that when [the Hospital] established a 401(k) 
plan in 1993, this action constituted opting in by" the Hospital under the Retirement Act. 
(R. 3 73) ( emphasis added). Ramsay and Smalling also claimed that they did not 
"recognize the legal significance" or appreciate the "legal effect" of the Hospital's 
establishment of a 401(k) benefit under the Retirement Act. (R. 380-81) (emphasis 
@ added). Thus, Ramsay and Smalling also acknowledged at this time that alleged liability 
under the Retirement Act arising from the Hospital's 401(k) plan is a legal, and not a 
factual, issue. 
On August 26, 2013, the Retirement Board's Hearing Officer granted the Hospital's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and entered Findings of Undisputed Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Partial Summary Judgment (hereafter the "Partial Summary 
@ Judgment Order"). (R. 422-30.) The Hospital had made clear in its Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, and again in its reply memorandum, that its Motion was limited to 
just the claim filed by the Board and did not apply to any possible claims Ramsay and 
Smalling could pursue.3 (R. 266-67, 410-11.) As a result, the Hearing Officer did not 
address at this time whether the statute of limitations applied to Ramsay and Smalling. 
(R. 422-27.) 
The Hearing Officer ordered that the Retirement Board's "claim for retirement 
contributions in this case is limited by the applicable three year statute of limitations to 
3 By this time, Ramsay and Smalling had not yet articulated any express claims that they 
@ were pursuing before the Retirement Board. (R. 43-44.) As described below, Ramsay and 
Smalling would later amend their Motion to Intervene to make clear that they were 
bringing a claim against the Hospital to compel funding of URS benefits. (R. 523-24.) 
7 
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contribution claims that rose between August. I 1, 2006 and April 30, 2009." (Id) The 
Hearing Officer explained that "[t]here is no evidence in the record that the Hospital @ 
actively or affirmatively concealed its 401(k) plan from [the Board]. Without such 
evidence, the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule does not apply." (R. 
427.) The Hearing Officer further "decline[d] to extend Utah law for tolling of the 
limitation period when a Respondent is silent about even an unknown statutory reporting 
obligation." (Id.) 
The Retirement Board had calculated the Hospital's alleged liability for URS 
contributions between 1993 and 2009 as $7,372,199.77. (R. 333.) Following the Partial 
Summary Judgment Order, the Board's contribution claim against the Hospital was 
reduced to $1,530,806.58. (Id.) 
Post-Summary Judgment Settlement 
Following the ruling on the Partial Summary Judgment Order, the Hospital entered 
into settlement discussions with the current and former employees who may have a claim 
to service credit in URS during the applicable three-year limitations period. (R. 501.) 
Utilizing monies received from a state grant,4 together with its own funds, the Hospital 
negotiated a monetary settlement with all but six of the affected employees. (R. 501, 
506.) The Hospital applied the balance of its available grant money to pay URS 
contributions allegedly owed during the limitations period to the Board for the six 
employees who did not settle-including for Ramsay and Smalling. (Id.) Thereafter, on 
May 16, 2014, the Board filed a Motion to Dismiss its Request for Board Action 
4 In the 2012 General Legislative Session, the Utah Legislature created a grant program 
to provide state funding assistance to rural county health care special service districts, 
such as the Hospital, in meeting a state retirement liability. (R. 501.) Pursuant to this 
program, the Hospital received a grant from the state to assist it in the resolution of the 
alleged URS liability in this case. (Id.) 
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"because all issues in the Board's-request have been resolved and the case between the 
Board and the Hospital is moot." (R. 498.) On June 17, 2014, the Hearing Officer granted 
the Board's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 529.) 
Summary Judgment Against Ramsay and Smalling 
On January 14, 2014, Ramsay and Smalling filed a Motion to Amend their Motion 
to Intervene to include a Statement of Claim "which explicitly establishes the relief 
Ramsay and Smalling seek .... " (R. 4 73.) Ramsay and Smalling' s proposed Statement 
@ of Claim stated that they were seeking an order that they "are entitled to service credits" 
under the Retirement Act "for the time they were employed from 1993 to 2009 and for 
funding from [the Hospital] as a participating employer under the Act of the full 
@ retirement benefits owed from 1993 to 2009 .... " (R. 481.) On May 19, 2014, the 
Hearing Officer granted the Motion to Amend the Motion to Intervene, and permitted 
filing of Ramsay and Smalling's Statement of Claim. (R. 511.) On June 2, 2014, the 
Hospital filed its Answer to Ramsay and Smalling's Statement of Claim, incorporating 
the defenses stated in its response to the Notice of Board Action, and specifically stating 
defenses for lack of standing, statute of limitations, and !aches, among others. (R. 515-
17.) 
On August 18, 2014, with the Board's claim fully resolved, the Hospital filed its 
Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of Ramsay and Smalling's claims. (R. 
531.) The Hospital sought a summary judgment that Ramsay and Smalling's claims for 
retirement contributions arising between August 11, 2006 and April 30, 2009 are moot 
and must be dismissed because the Hospital had already funded URS contributions for 
them during this period. (Id.) The Hospital also sought a summary judgment dismissing 
Ramsay and Smalling' s claims for URS contributions arising prior to August 11, 2006 as 
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barred .by tpe statute of limitations. (Id.) In connection with this Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the parties entered into a stipulation that "for the purposes of this Motion only, ~ 
the parties ask the Hearing Officer to assume for sake of argument that the Hospital was 
an eligible employer under the Retirement Act, and thus able to participate in the State 
Retirement Systems." (R. 561.) @ 
Ramsay and Smalling opposed the Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
argued that the limitations period should be equitably tolled for URS contributions 
allegedly arising prior to August 11, 2006. (R. 577.) Ramsay and Smalling argued (again) @ 
that the Hospital engaged in concealment when it did not fulfill alleged statutory 
reporting obligations to the Board. (R. 578.) However, Ramsay and Smalling failed to 
adduce any evidence that the Hospital was aware of such a statutory reporting obligation. 
(R. 637.) 
Ramsay and Smalling also argued that the limitations period should be equitably 
tolled because they lacked knowledge of the "necessary facts" underlying their claims. 
(R. 679.) Specifically, in contrast to their response to the Hospital's prior Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment where they argued that they lacked knowledge of the "legal 
analysis," "legal significance," and "legal effect" of the Hospital's establishment of a 
401 (k) benefit, Ramsay and Smalling argued now t~at they lacked knowledge of the 
"fact" that the Hospital's 401 (k) benefit triggered liability for URS benefits under the 
Retirement Act. (R. 373, 380-81, 679.) 
Ramsay and Smalling also filed a cross motion for summary judgment that the 
"legal effect" of the Hospital's provision of a 401(k) benefit "was to make [the Hospital] 
a participating employer in the URS under the [Retirement] Act." (R. 569-83.) 
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On May 18, 2015, the Hearing Officer entered its Findings of Undisputed Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment (the "Summary Judgment Order") granting 
the Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying as moot Ramsay and 
Smalling's cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 631-38.) The Hearing Officer 
® found that Ramsay and Smalling's claim to URS contributions arising between August 
11, 2006 and April 30, 2009 was moot and must be dismissed because the Hospital had 
already funded retirement contributions for them during that time period. (R. at 635.) The 
vi> Hearing Officer held that Ramsay and Smalling' s claim for contributions arising prior to 
August 11, 2006 was barred by a three year statute of limitations. (Id.) The Hearing 
Officer further held that Ramsay and Smalling are not entitled to tolling of the statute of 
limitations for their claim to retirement contributions arising prior to August 11, 2006. 
(Id.) The Hearing Officer observed as follows: 
.,,. 
Ramsay and Smalling's contribution claim arises from a single fact: the 
Hospital's provision of a 40l(k) plan .... Intervenors have known about [this] 
fact . . . since at least the mid-1990s. Although Intervenors may not have 
discovered their legal theory until much later, the belated discovery of a legal 
theory does not justify equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 
(R. 636-37.) On June 4, 2015, the Retirement Board entered its Final Order adopting the 
~ Hearing Officer's Summary Judgment Order and dismissing Ramsay and Smalling's 
claims. (R. 640-41.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Hospital and the Intervenors stipulated that, for the purposes of the Hospital's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Hearing Officer should "assume for sake of 
argument that the Hospital was an eligible employer under the Retirement Act, and thus 
able to participate in the State Retirement System." (R. 560-61.) With that caveat, the 
Hospital and Intervenors stipulated to a set of undisputed facts regarding the Hospital's 
11 
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Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 561-62.) The p~ies' stipulated undisputed facts are 
repeated verbatim below: 
I. Kane County Hospital (hereinafter the "Hospital") is a special service district 
within the meaning of Utah Code § 17D-1-101, et seq. The special service district was 
created by the Kane County Commission in 1989 to operate the only hospital in Kane 
County. 
2. Kane County Hospital, as a special service district, was an employer as 
defined under Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-102(23)(a) at all times relevant to this dispute.5 
3. In 1993, the Hospital began offering a 40l(k) retirement plan to its employees. 
4. Intervenor Lori Ramsay participated in the Hospital's 401(k) retirement plan 
from January 1, 1994 through July 20, 2007. 
5. Intervenor Daniel Smalling participated in_ the· Hospital's 401(k) retirement 
plan from October 7, 1995 through July 22, 2000. 
6. On January 5, 2007, Intervenor Lori Ramsay, an employee of the Hospital, 
spoke with Cindy Bon, Accounts Service Manager for the Utah State Retirement Office 
("Retirement Office"), to obtain information about state retirement benefits. Thereafter, 
the Retirement Office sent Ms. Ramsay a letter with the information that Ms. Ramsay 
requested and a copy of a Retirement New Group Questionnaire, which Ms. Ramsay 
provided to the Hospital. The purpose of the Retirement New Group Questionnaire is to 
determine eligibility for participation in the State Retirement System. 
5 As the Hospital explains in Section IV below, Ramsay and Smalling now urge the Court 
of Appeals to transfonn this stipulated fact into a legal conclusion. Because the Hospital 
stipulated to this fact only for the purpose of the summary-judgment motion, the 
Retirement Board did not reach this issue below, and it is therefore beyond the scope of 
this appeal. 
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7. On January 22, 2007, the Hospital completed the Retirement New Group 
Questionnaire and returned it to the Retirement Office. 
8. On February 12, 2007, the Retirement Office informed the Hospital that it was 
eligible for membership in the State Retirement System. The Hospital declined to make 
@ any retrospective or prospective retirement contributions to the State Retirement System. 
9. On April 30, 2009, pursuant to legislation passed by the Utah State Legislature 
in the 2009 General Legislative Session, the Hospital's Board of Directors approved a 
iJ resolution to irrevocably elect nonparticipation in the State Retirement System. 
10. The Hospital has paid all retirement contributions to the Retirement Office on 
behalf of the Intervenors for the period of time between June 2006 and April 30, 2009.6 
11. The Retirement Office has granted each of the Intervenors retirement service 
credit for the entire time period for which retirement contributions were received (i.e., 
June 2006 through April 30, 2009). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Ramsay and Smalling's pre-August 11, 2006 claims are barred by the applicable 
three-year statute of limitations. The Retirement Board concluded that Ramsay and 
Smalling could not escape that limitation through use of the equitable discovery rule. The 
Board is right. Ramsay and Smalling fail to make the initial showing required of any 
party seeking relief under the equitable discovery rule: that they reasonably lacked 
knowledge of the facts underlying their claims. Only one fact underlies their claim and 
legal theory in this case: the Hospital's provision of a 40l(k) plan. That happened nearly 
6 The Hospital funded retirement contributions from June 2006 through April 30, 2009, 
rather than from August 11, 2006, because the Retirement Board took the position that a 
claim for retirement contributions does not accrue until 60 days following the end of each 
pay period. (R. at 633.) The Hearing Officer declined to issue a ruling about whether the 
statute oflimitations actually extends to June 2006. (R. at 635.) 
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two decades ago, and Ramsay and Smalling concede that they were aware of the plan 
from almost the beginning. 
Ramsay and Smalling propose an end-around: while they admit knowledge of the 
401(k) plan, they argue that they didn't know the legal implications of the plan. But Utah 
law is clear: the belated discovery of a legal theory does not toll the limitations period 
under the discovery rule. Ramsay and Smalling's discovery-rule argument fails for a 
second reason: the Retirement Board found that nothing in the record suggested that the 
Hospital had concealed the facts supporting Ramsay and Smalling's claims or that 
exceptional circumstances justified equitable tolling. W~thout satisfying either of those 
alternative prongs-concealment or exceptional circumstances-Ramsay and Smalling 
cannot avail themselves of the equitable discovery rule. 
Ramsay and Smalling's remaining arguments should not be reached on appeal. At 
several points in their brief, Ramsay and Smalling urge the Court to apply an alternative 
statutory discovery rule-one found in the Governmental Immunity Act ("GIA"). This 
argument was not raised below, and Ramsay and Smalling make no plain-error or 
exceptional-circumstances arguments in their opening brief. The Court should thus 
decline to consider this argument. In any event, the GIA does not apply to claims filed 
before the Retirement Board. 
Ramsay and Smalling also suggest that it "could be argued" that their claims will 
not actually accrue until they retire. Ramsay and Smalling fail to assign error to the 
Retirement Board's conclusion that their claims accrued at each pay period. What is 
more, Ramsay and Smalling fail to cite or apply relevant case law or to develop this 
argument. They thus fail to meet their burden of persuasion on this issue. 
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Finally, Ramsay and Smalling urge the Court to interpret the Retirement Act to find . 
that the Hospital is liable to make URS contributions under that Act. But the Retirement 
Board never reached the merits of that argument-its decision was based solely on 
limitations grounds. Because Ramsay and Smalling's claims are time-barred, there is no 
@ reason for this Court to reach the issue of the Hospital's alleged liability under the 
Retirement Act. However, even if Ramsay and Smalling had filed timely claims, the 
interpretation and application of the Retirement Act should be performed in the first 
G;) instance by the Retirement Board, the specialized agency assigned to do just that. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS RAMSAY 
AND SMALLING'S CLAIMS. 
There is no dispute that the three year limitation period provided by Utah Code 
section 78B-2-305( 4) "for liability created by the statutes of this state" applies to Ramsay 
and Smalling's claims in this case. The issue for this appeal is whether Ramsay and 
Smalling were entitled to equitable tolling of this three year limitations period. As 
explained below, the Retirement Board's Hearing Officer correctly applied Utah's 
limitations law when it held that Ramsay and Smalling' s claims are time-barred. 
A. The Retirement Board Applied Utah's Limitations Law Correctly. 
Scores of Utah cases discuss statutes of limitations. The same essential principles 
echo through those cases. First, the general rule: "a cause of action accrues and the 
relevant statute of limitations begins to run upon the happening of the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action." Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 
P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, a clear line: 
@ "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running of the 
statute of limitations." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And third, a limited caveat: 
15 
@ 1220600.4 
"in certain instances, the discovery rule may operate to toll the peripd of limitations until 
the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action." Id. (internal quotation @ 
marks omitted). 
The discovery rule, in tum, applies in three narrow circumstances: (I) when it is 
mandated by statute, (2) when a defendant's concealment keeps the plaintiff from 
becoming aware of the cause of action, or (3) when "exceptional circumstances" make 
the application of the general rule "irrational or unjust." See Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. 
Carson, 2003 UT App 316, ,r 13, 78 P.3d 616. Utah courts refer to the first circumstance 
as the "statutory discovery rule," and the second and third circumstances as alternative 
versions of the "equitable discovery rule." See id. ,r 24; Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, 
,r 23, 223 P.3d 1128. Before either version of the equitable discovery rule applies, "the 
plaintiff must make an initial showing that he did not know nor should have reasonably 
known the facts underlying the cause of action in time to reasonably comply with the 
limitations period." See Berneau, 2009 UT 87, ,r 23. This initial lack-of-knowledge 
showing must account for both actual and constructive knowledge. Id. 
The Retirement Board's Hearing Officer applied this framework here. Ramsay and 
Smalling did not argue below that a statutory discovery rule applies, and the Retirement 
Board found that "there is no discovery rule mandated by statute." (R. 636.)7 As a result, 
the Retirement Board applied the equitable discovery rule. The Board found that Ramsay 
and Smalling's "contribution claim arises from a single fact"-"the Hospital's provision 
of a 40J(k) plan'.'-and that Ramsay and Smalling "have known about the fact underlying 
their cause of action ... since at least the mid-1990s." (Id.) Although Ramsay and 
7 On appeal, they appear to argue that Utah's Governmental Immunity Act provides a 
discovery rule. That unpreserved argument is discussed in Section II, below. 
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Smalling "may not have discovered their legal theory until much later,". the Retirement 
Board explained, "the belated discovery of a legal theory does not justify equitable tolling 
of the statute of limitations." (Id. at 636-3 7.) The Retirement Board thus concluded that 
Ramsay and Smalling had not "made the required threshold showing that they did not 
know, nor reasonably should have discovered, the facts underlying their claim in this case 
in time to bring a timely cause of action," and thus Ramsay and Smalling "are not entitled 
to equitable tolling." (Id. at 637.) 
Nevertheless, the Retirement Board also specifically found that even if Ramsay and 
Smalling could make their threshold lack-of-knowledge showing, "[t]he Hospital has not 
concealed its 401(k) plan" from them and that "[t]here are no exceptional circumstances 
@ that justify equitable tolling of the limitation period." (Id. at 637-638.) 
As the Hospital explains in detail below, the Retirement Board did not err in its 
application of Utah's limitations law or in finding that Ramsay and Smalling's claims are 
time-barred. 
B. Ramsay and Smalling Failed to Make a Threshold Showing that They 
Lacked Knowledge of the Facts Underlying Their Claims. 
To qualify for tolling under either a concealment or exceptional-circumstances 
theory, Ramsay and Smalling were required to make an "initial showing" that they did 
not "know the facts underlying their cause of action in time to reasonably comply with 
the limitations period." HeljNch v. Adams, 2013 UT App 37, ,r 9, 299 P.3d 2 (internal 
quotation and alteration marks omitted); see also Garza v. Burnett, 2013 UT 66, ,I 10, 
321 P.3d 1104 (calling this showing an "essential prerequisite to the application of the 
discovery rule"). This showing has several interlocking parts: Ramsay and Smalling must 
~ show that they did not have either actual or constructive knowledge and that their lack of 
knowledge was reasonable. And, critically, Ramsay and Smalling must show that they 
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lack~d knowledge of facts, not that they lacked knowledge of the legal effect or legal. 
consequences of those facts. As the Utah Court of Appeals put it, "The limitations period @ 
is postponed only by belated discovery of key facts and not by delayed discovery of legal 
theories." Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
1. Ramsay and Smalling had actual knowledge of the single fact 
underlying their claims. 
Adopting the Retirement Board's Notice of Board Action, Ramsay and Smalling 
alleged in their Statement of Claim below that the Retirement Act required the Hospital, 
"as a governmental entity, to participate with URS once [the Hospital] detennined to 
offer a [40l(k)] retirement plan to its employees" in 1993. (R. 5-7, 523-24.) Thus, 
Ramsay and Smalling's legal theory is predicated on a single fact-the Hospital's 
provision of a 401(k) benefit in 1993. Ramsay and Smalling admit actual knowledge of 
the Hospital's 40l(k) benefit dating back to the mid-1990s. (R. 561.) Accordingly, 
Ramsay and Smalling were armed with knowledge of the fact underlying their cause of 
action in time to commence a timely action. See Helji--ich, 2013 UT App 37, ~ 9. 
Yet Ramsay and Smalling still contend that they "lacked knowledge of the 
necessary facts" underlying their claims in time to bring a timely cause of action. (See 
Appellants' Br. 11.) But what Ramsay and Smalling list among their "necessary facts" 
are not facts at all-they are legal conclusions. Ramsay and Smalling argue that the 
"facts" they did not timely discover include (1) the Hospital's 401(k) plan "obligated 
KCH to provide full retirement benefits to its employees under the Act," (2) the Hospital 
"had an obligation to fund retirement benefits for Ramsay and Smalling," and (3) Ramsay 
and Smalling were entitled to more than the 40l(k) benefits they received. (Id. at 27.) 
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Again, these are not facts-they are legal conclusions drawn.from the provisions of 
the Retirement Act itself. Ramsay and Smalling acknowledged this in the proceedings 
below. Before the Retirement Board, they said, time and time again, that what they hadn't 
learned prior to 2009 was the legal effect or legal implications of the facts they already 
® knew. When intervening in the Hospital's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against 
the Retirement Board, Ramsay and Smalling argued that equitable tolling should apply 
because they "had no knowledge of, nor reasonable opportunity to discovery, the legal 
@ analysis" regarding the Hospital's purported liability under the Retirement Act and the 
"legal effect" of the Hopital' s establishment of a 401 (k) plan. (R. 3 73) Later in that same 
pleading, Ramsay and Smalling again emphasized that prior to 2009 they were unable to 
(i) "recognize the legal significance" of the 40l(k) plan. (R. 380.) 
Utah case law leaves no doubt about whether ignorance of the legal implications of 
facts qualifies a party for equitable tolling: for at least the past thirty years, Utah courts 
(j have consistently held that "simple ignorance of or obliviousness to the existence of a 
cause of action will not prevent the running of the statute of limitation. "8 
8 See Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ,r,r 20, 108 P.3d 741 ("Mere 
ignorance of the existence of a cause of action will neither prevent the running of the 
statute of limitations nor excuse a plaintiffs failure to file a claim within the relevant 
statutory period."); Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1998) (same); 
Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995) (same); Sevy 
v. Sec. Title Co. of S. Utah, 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995) (same); Warren v. Provo City 
Co,p., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) (same); O'Neal v. Div. of Family Servs., State of 
Utah, 821 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Utah 1991) (same); Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. 
Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1987) (same); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 
P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) (same); Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) 
(same); Helfrich v. Adams, 2013 UT App 37, ,i 13, 299 P.3d 2 (same); Sycamore Family, 
L.L.C. v. Vintage on the River Homeowners Ass 'n, Inc., 2006 UT App 387, ,r 4 n.3, 145 
P.3d 1177 (same); Cedar Prof'/ Plaza, L.C. v. Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT App 36, ,r 11, 
131 P.3d 275 (same); Hom v. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 102 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (same); Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2004 UT App 436, 
,r 18, 104 P.3d 646 (same); Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah Res. Int'/, 905 P.2d 312, 315 
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Thus, by basing their threshold lack-of-knowledge argument on unknown legal 
theories rather than on unknown facts, Ramsay and Smalling fall at the first equitable- ~ 
tolling hurdle. The equitable discovery rule may only toll the limitations period "until the 
discovery of facts forming the basis of the cause of action." See Russell Packard Dev., 
Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ,i,i 20-21, 108 P.3d 741 (emphasis added); Snow v. Rudd, \ii 
2000 UT 20, ,i,i 10-13, 998 P.2d 262 (same). As the Retirement Board found below, a 
single fact forms the basis of Ramsay and Smalling's cause of action-the Hospital's 
funding of a 401 (k) plan. Ramsay and Smalling concede that they knew about the 
Hospital's 40l(k) plan for more than 15 years before they moved to intervene. (R. 594). 
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer's order dismissing Ramsay and Smalling's claims as 
time-barred should be affirmed. 
2. Even if the legal implications of the Retirement Act constituted 
"underlying facts," Ramsay and Smalling had constructive knowledge 
of those legal implications. 
Even if Ramsay and Smalling's actual knowledge of the purported "legal effect" of I 
the Hospital's 401(k) plan were relevant to the tolling analysis (which it is not), Ramsay 
and Smalling also failed to demonstrate that they lacked constructive knowledge9 of these 
legal effects-after all, these legal effects are creatures of a published statute. The 
"unknown facts" Ramsay and Smalling list are simply a part of the framework 
established by the Retirement Act. In other words, the Retirement Act itself would have 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (same); Avis v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm 'n, 837 P.2d 584, 
587-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (same); Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (same). 
9 Constructive knowledge refers to knowledge that a plaintiff "reasonably should have 
discovered .... " See Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, ,i 22. 
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made each of these "unknown facts" known to Ramsay and Smalling, had they taken the 
opportunity to review it. IO 
Ramsay spoke with an agent of the Retirement Board in January 2007 and sent a 
follow-up letter to inquire about the Hospital's eligibility to participate in the State 
<i Retirement System. See Statement of Facts ,r 6, supra. Ramsay started to participate in 
the Hospital's 401(k) plan on January 1, 1994. Id. at ,r 4. And Smalling started to 
participate in the Hospital's 401(k) plan on October 7, 1995. Id. at ,r 5. Ramsay and 
@ Smalling do not explain why they waited until January 2007 to make such an inquiry 
when they could have made the same inquiry more than a decade earlier, when they first 
began to receive a 40l(k) benefit. Ramsay and Smalling's failure to make that inquiry 
@ disqualifies them from equitable tolling. See Walker Drug Co., 902 P.2d at 1231-32 
(refusing to toll when plaintiffs failed to meet "their initial burden to show that they did 
not know and could not have discovered the facts underlying their cause of action in time 
to file a complaint"). 
Ramsay and Smalling direct the Court to a 2015 Utah Court of Appeals case called 
Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County, 2015 UT App 173, 355 P.3d 1047, 
alleging that in Highlands the Court "rejected a very similar argument presented by a 
governmental employer." (See Appellants' Br. 29.) But Highlands serves only to 
IO Ramsay and Smalling may argue that if they had constructive notice of the Retirement 
Act, then the Hospital had constructive notice too. However, whether or not the Hospital 
had constructive notice of the Retirement Act is not relevant in the equitable tolling 
analysis. The threshold lack-of-knowledge showing to qualify for equitable tolling is 
focused on what a plaintiff knew and should have known, not on what a defendant knew 
or should have known. See, e.g., Helfrich, 2013 UT App 37, ,i 9. Moreover, to satisfy the 
concealment prong of equitable tolling, it is not enough to establish that the Hospital 
should have known about its alleged liability under the Retirement Act. Instead, Ramsay 
and Smalling were required to show that the Hospital engaged in active or affinnative 
concealment. See Russell Packard, 2003 UT App 316, ,i,i 15, 21. 
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reinforce the Hospital's argument. In that. case, the Wasatch County Commission sought 
to raise funds to build a fire station near the J ordanelle Reservoir. See 2015 UT App 173, 4'l 
if 2. To do so, the Commissioners passed Resolution 99-3, which authorized a monthly 
landowner fee. Id. if 3. But to pay down the construction bond on the fire station, the 
Wasatch County Fire Protection Special Service District charged an additional lump-sum Ii) 
fee to landowners that was not authorized by Resolution 99-3. Id. i1 4. A landowner sued 
to recover the unauthorized fees it had paid, including fees paid outside the four-year 
statute-of-limitations period. Id. ,r 41. The trial court held that the landowner was not @ 
entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period and the landowner appealed. Id. 
Although the Court of Appeals reversed the. trial court, and held that equitable 
tolling was appropriate in the circumstances of that case, this case is distinguishable from 
Highlands. As the Highlands court explained, not only did the landowner lack actual 
knowledge of the lump-sum fee's invalidity, it also lacked constructive knowledge, 
because Resolution 99-3 was "silen[t] on the subject of lump-sum service fees." Id ,r 44. 
That is not true here. According to Ramsay and Smalling ( and the Retirement Board), the 
Retirement Act is not silent on the Hospital's alleged liability. Instead, Ramsay and 
Smalling (and the Board) contend that Utah Code section 49-l 1-202(2)(a) expressly 
requires the Hospital to participate in URS because the Hospital provided a private 
40l(k) benefit. (R. 5, 523-24.) Thus, the Retirement Act provides Ramsay and Smalling 
with constructive notice of the legal effect of the Hospital's 401(k) benefit. 
Furthermore, Highlands cannot fairly be read the way Ramsay and Smalling urge 
the Court to read it: if Highlands stands for the proposition that belated discovery of a 
legal effect of a fact tolls the statute of limitations under the discovery rule, then 
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Highlands would run counter to at least thirty years of Utah precedent saying otherwise. I I 
Had Highlands intended to overrule those cases, it would have done so explicitly. 12 
In sum, the equitable discovery rule applies only when a plaintiff reasonably lacks 
actual and constructive knowledge of the facts underlying a cause of action-not when a 
@ plaintiff lacks knowledge about the legal implications of those facts. See, e.g., Russell 
Packard, 2005 UT 14, ,i,r 20-21. Ramsay and Smalling had actual knowledge of the facts 
underlying their claim for retirement benefits (the Hospital's 40l(k) plan) for more than 
ijj) 15 years before they filed their Motion to Intervene. And even if the legal implications of 
that 401(k) were ·relevant in the equitable-tolling analysis, Ramsay and Smalling had 
constructive knowledge of the Retirement Act's rules throughout the relevant period. 
@ Simply put, Ramsay and Smalling are not entitled to any tolling of the statute of 
limitations-even if they did not understand the law. 
11 See note 8, supra. 
12 As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, "In general, the Court has not subsequently 
read a decision to work a 'sharp break in the web of the law' unless that ruling caused 
'such an abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine as to constitute an entirely new rule 
which in effect replaced an order one.' Furthermore, ' [ s ]uch a break has been recognized 
only when a decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court, or disapproves a 
practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases."' See State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 
503, 509 (Utah 1997) ( citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Turner v. Univ. 
of Utah Hasps. & Clinics, 2013 UT 52, ,r 15, 310 P.3d 1212; see also Beddoes v. Griffin, 
2007 UT 35, ,r 11, 158 P.3d 1102 ("[H]ad we intended to overrule ProMax in Loffi·edo, 
we would have done so explicity."); Nat'! Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Moore, 
882 P .2d 1168, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("This court is not in a position to overrule or 
hold contrary to explicitly holdings of the supreme court under the doctrine of stare 
decisis."). 
23 
(j) 1220600.4 
C. The Hearing Officer Did Not Err in Finding that the Hospital Did Not 
Conceal Its 40l(k) Plan or in Finding that No Exceptional Circumstances 
Justified Equitable Tolling. 
Because Ramsay and Smalling have not satisfied their threshold showing that they 
lacked knowledge about the Hospital's 401(k) plan (i.e., that they lacked knowledge of 
the facts underlying their claim), there is no need to specifically address Ramsay and 
Smalling's concealment and exceptional-circumstances arguments. But for sake of 
argument, even if the Court set aside the threshold lack-of-knowledge requirement, 
Ramsay and Smalling still have not established that tolling is appropriate under a 
concealment or exceptional circumstances theory. 
1. Ramsay and Smalling are not entitled to equitable tolling under a 
concealment theory. 
As explained above, one fact underlies Ramsay and Smalling' s contribution claim 
against the Hospital-the Hospital's offering of a 40 I (k) benefit to its employees in 1993. 
In order to obtain tolling under the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule, 
Ramsay and Smalling must show that the· Hospital actively or affinnatively concealed 
this 401(k) benefit from them. See Russell/Packard, 2003 UT App 316, ,r,r 15, 21; see 
also Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, ,r,r 38-39; Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt 
Lake City, 2007 UT 25, ,r 49, 156 P.3d 806. 
The Hospital never hid its 40 I (k) benefit from Ramsay or Smalling, and thus the 
Retirement Board was right to find that Ramsay and Smalling failed to show 
concealment. After all, Ramsay and Smalling participated in the Hospitals' 40l(k) plan 
for many years. Ramsay has known about the 40l(k) benefit since at least January 1, 
1994, when she started to participate in the program. And Smalling has known about the 
401 (k) benefit since at least October 7, I 995, when he started to participate in the 
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program. See Statement of Facts ,r,r 4-5, supra. Accordingly; there can be no finding of 
concealment. 
Ramsay and Smalling argue that they qualify for equitable tolling under the 
concealment prong because the Hospital "failed to report to [the Retirement Board] the 
(ii necessary information about eligible employees." (See Appellants' Br. 24-25.) The 
Hearing Officer considered and rejected that argument, finding that "[t]here is no 
evidence in the record that the Hospital actually knew about any possible requirement 
" that it report and make retirement contributions to the State Retirement Systems prior to 
February 12, 2007-when URS infonned the Hospital that it was eligible to participate." 
(R. 637.) Ramsay and Smalling came forward with no evidence to dispute that finding. 
~ Accordingly, because tolling under the concealment version of the equitable discovery 
rule requires a showing that the Hospital actively or affirmatively concealed its 401(k) 
plan 13, mere silence in the face of an unknown statutory obligation does not constitute 
concealment. 
Ramsay and Smalling also argue that the Hospital concealed the underlying facts 
here by "communicat[ing] to its employees, including Ramsay and Smalling ... that [its] 
40 I (k) plan was proper, legitimate, and constituted all retirement benefits to which the 
employees were entitled under state or federal statute." (Appellant's Br. 25.) However, 
Ramsay and Smalling do not cite to any portion of the record in support of that 
allegation, just as they failed below to provide any support for that claim. Below, Ramsay 
and Smalling submitted the Declaration of Dan Smalling, which provides only that "KCH 
and its agents provided regular statements in connection with the 401 (k) and never 
13 See Russell Packard, 2003 UT App 316, ,r 27; Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, ,r,r 38-
39; Colosimo, 2007 UT 25, ,r 49 
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communicated to me any information to indicate that the 40 I (k) plan was not properly 
established." (R. 594.) The provision of 401(k) statements-presumably about the status 
of Mr. Smalling's 40l(k) account (he does not say)-is not evidence that the Hospital 
made some type of affirmative statement to Smalling about his possible entitlement to 
URS benefits or any other retirement benefits. 
In any event, the question here is whether the Hospital concealed its 401(k) plan-
the sole fact underlying Ramsay and Smalling' s claims. Ramsay and Smalling have not 
come forward with any evidence that the Hospital actively or affinnatively concealed its 
40 I (k) plan from them. To the contrary, Ramsay and Smalling admit a long-standing 
knowledge of these benefits. Indeed, Smalling' s declaration makes clear that he received 
"regular statements in connection with the 401(k)" plan from the Hospital. (R. 594.) The 
Retirement Board thus did not err when it found that Ramsay and Smalling failed to 
provide evidence that the Hospital concealed the facts underlying their cause of action. 
2. Ramsay and Smalling are not entitled to equitable tolling under an 
exceptional-circumstances theory. 
Finally, Ramsay and Smalling argue that the statute of limitations should be tolled 
under an exceptional circumstances theory because ( 1) there is a purported fiduciary 
relationship between them and the Hospital (see Appellants' Br. 28-29), and (2) the 
balance of banns tips in their favor (see id. at 30-32). Neither of these arguments 
supports tolling under an exceptional-circumstances theory. 
a. The Hospital did not owe Ramsay and Smalling a fiduciary 
duty to report an unknown (and disputed) obligation. 
Ramsay and Smalling argue that exceptional circumstances justify tolling of the 
limitations period because they contend there is "a fiduciary relationship" between them 
and the Hospital and the Hospital did not disclose its alleged obligations under the 
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Retirement Act. (See id. at 28-29.) However, the Hospital-did not assume fiduciary 
obligations when it offered a 401(k) benefit (administered by third parties) to its 
employees-and Ramsay and Smalling again cite no law to the contrary. 14 
Further, the Hospital did not knowingly fail to disclose anything. There is no 
@ evidence that the Hospital knew about a purported obligation to participate in URS prior 
to February 2007, when the Retirement Board informed the Hospital of its position in that 
regard. (R. 63 7.) 
In any event, the Hospital's silence about an unknown and disputed statutory 
obligation does not give rise to tolling of the statute of limitations. Adopting analysis 
from another jurisdiction concerning equitable tolling, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
@ that "'in no case ... is mere silence or failure to disclose sufficient in itself to constitute 
fraudulent concealment."' Colosimo, 2007 UT 25, ,i 44 (quoting Helleloid v. Jndep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 361, 149 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (D. Minn. 2001)); see also First Sec. Bank of 
Utah NA. v. Banbeny Dev. C01p., 786 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1990) ("Silence, in order 
to be an actionable fraud, must relate to a material matter known to the party ... "). 
Accordingly, because there is no evidence that the Hospital knew that providing a 401(k) 
benefit to its employees would trigger possible liability under the Retirement Act, its 
unknowing failure to disclose that disputed obligation to Ramsay and Smalling does not 
support equitable tolling. 
14 Ramsay and Smalling cite case law for the proposition that "[ f]ailure to disclose is not 
fraudulent unless a fiduciary duty exists," see Appellants' Br. 28 (citing Helfrich, 2013 
UT App 37, ,r 15). But they cite no law supporting their assertion that an employer's 
decision to provide a 40l(k) benefit for an employee creates a fiduciary duty requiring an 
employer to disclose what other retirement benefits he or she may be entitled to receive. 
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b. The balancing of hardships weighs against tolling. 
Ramsay and Smalling also argue that exceptional circumstances justify tolling of 
the limitations period because the balancing of hardships favors them. See Appellants' 
Br. 30-32. If a claimant has met the threshold showing that they did not know and should 
not have reasonably discovered the facts underlying their cause of action, Utah courts 
may equitably toll a limitations period based on exceptional circumstances. See Helfi'"ich, 
2013 UT App 3 7, iI 9. Applied here, the Court must weigh the hardship on Ramsay and 
Smalling caused by not being able to seek state retirement contributions prior to August 
2006 against the prejudice to the Hospital arising "from difficulties of proof caused by 
the passage of time." Id. ,I 18. As the Retirement Board found below, these relative 
hardships do not weigh in favor of Ramsay and Smalling. (R. 638.) 
Ramsay and Smalling' s intervention in this case proves the old adage that "no 
good deed goes unpunished." Ramsay and Smalling make a technical statutory-
construction argument that because the Hospital provided a 40 I (k) benefit to them, they 
should also receive URS retirement benefits. But Ramsay and Smalling were not actually 
banned when the Hospital provided them a 401 (k) retirement benefit. The Hospital was 
under no obligation to provide this benefit to them, which included employer-matching 
contributions. (R. 32.) If the Hospital had not provided 40l(k) benefits, then Ramsay and 
Smalling would have absolutely no employer-provided retirement benefits at all. Thus, 
Ramsay and Smalling were not prejudiced by the 401 (k) benefits they received. 
On the other hand, the Hospital will be substantially prejudiced from difficulties of 
proof caused by the passage of time. Evidence concerning the adoption of the Hospital's 
401 (k) plan in 1993 is no longer available. Memories have faded with the passing of two 
decades since the implementation of the 401 (k) plan. The Hospital has also been unable 
to find correspondence from 1993 between its prior management and the third-party 
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administrators of its 401(k) plan. Thus, if liability were found dating back to 1993, the 
Hospital's ability to seek indemnification from these third party administrators would be 
impaired. Such evidentiary problems could have been avoided if Ramsay and Smalling 
had not waited until 2007 to investigate their possible entitlement to URS benefits. 
@ Accordingly, exceptional circumstances do not justify equitable tolling.15 
II. RAMSAY AND SMALLING HAVE NOT PRESERVED AN ARGUMENT 
THAT A STATUTORY DISCOVERY RULE APPLIES. 
For the first time on appeal, Ramsay and Smalling appear to argue that the 
discovery rule that appears in Utah's Governmental Immunity Act (GIA) applies here. 
Ramsay and Smalling acknowledge that they "did not specifically discuss the [GIA's] 
statutory discovery rule." Put less delicately, Ramsay and Smalling did not raise this 
argument below. 
A. Ramsay and Smalling Did Not Preserve an Argument About the 
Discovery Rule Contained in the GIA. 
Ramsay and Smalling argue that the equitable discovery rule that was "briefed and 
decided by the USRB hearing officer" and the GIA's statutory discovery rule are "close" 
and "overlapping," and it thus would be "proper" for the Court of Appeals to overlook 
@ their failure to raise this argument below. (Appellants' Br. 22-23.) This proposition 
contradicts Utah law. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must present the issue 
15 Ramsay and Smalling also argue that the Hospital will not be prejudiced by tolling 
because "[ f]unds are available to pay the value of the service credits Ramsay and 
Smalling seek" because of an amendment passed in 2012 to U.C.A. § 26-9-5. This is not 
true and is unsupported by the record. The Hospital used limited funds it received from 
the Legislature to resolve its alleged URS liability. (R. 501, 507 .) Some of these funds 
went directly to employees in exchange for an affidavit relinquishing any right to URS 
service credit. (Id.) For employees who did not sign an affidavit relinquishing URS 
benefits (including Ramsay and Smalling), the Hospital applied the funds it received 
from the Legislature (and some of its own) to fund URS service credits during the 
applicable limitations period. (Id.) All grant funds were exhausted during that process. 
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below "in such a way that the [decision-maker] has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 
438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 151, 99 P.3d 801. To meet that 
requirement, the issue must not only be raised in a timely manner, but it also must be 
raised with specificity-"specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error of 
which counsel complains." State v. Byrant, 965 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
"When a party fails to present an issue [below], and instead raises the issue for the 
first time on appeal," Utah appellate courts "require that the party articulate an 
appropriate justification for appellate review." State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ,r 24, 282 P.3d 
985 (internal quotation marks omitted). Given Ramsay and Smalling' s failure to raise this 
issue below, they have two options on appeal: they "must argue either that [their] claim 
should be evaluated under the plain error standard or that [their] claim qualifies as an 
exceptional circumstance." Id Ramsay and Smalling do not make either argument. 
Accordingly, this Court should decline to reach their GIA argument on appeal. See 
Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40,172 n.69, 344 P.3d 581, (when a party "raises claims for 
the first time on appeal," the appellate court will decline to reach them unless the party 
urging review "argue[s] that either exceptional circumstances or plain error justify 
review"). 
Even if Ramsay and Smalling pivot in their reply brief to argue these exceptions to 
the preservation requirement, the Court should not consider those arguments. Utah 
appellate courts "have consistently 'refused to consider arguments of plain error raised 
for the first time in an appellant's reply brief, even if the plain error argument is in 
response to a dispute over preservation raised for the first time in the appellee's brief." 
See Marcroft v. Labor Comm 'n, 2015 UT App 174, 14, 356 P.3d 164. In short, "[a]n 
appellant proceeds at his peril if preservation or plain error is not dealt with in his 
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opening brief." Id. .,r 4 n. l. That is precisely what Ramsay and Smalling have done here. 
Thus, this Court should decline to reach the question of whether the statutory discovery 
rule in the GIA applies to this case.16 
B. Even Had Ramsay and Smalling Preserved Their GIA Argument, It Fails 
on Its Merits. 
Even if Ramsay and Smalling had preserved an issue about the statutory discovery 
rule in the GIA by raising it to the Hearing Officer below, the GIA simply does not apply 
to claims filed before the State Retirement Board (or any other administrative agency). 
Instead, the GIA only applies to matters over which the "district courts have exclusive, 
original jurisdiction." See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-501(1). Here, the Legislature has 
delegated exclusive adjudicative authority over all URS retirement-benefit disputes to the 
Retirement Board. See Utah Code Ann. § 49-l l-613{l)(b). Thus, as the Utah Supreme 
Court held when it affirmed dismissal of Ramsay and Smalling's state court lawsuit, 
district courts lack jurisdiction to address the retirement-benefit claims asserted by 
Ramsay and Smalling in this case. See Ramsay v. Kane County Human Res. Special Serv. 
Dist., 2014 UT 5, ,i,r 9-13, 17, 322 P.3d 1163. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer was 
correct when it held that "[h ]ere, there is no discovery rule mandated by statute. As a 
result, the limitations period on Ramsay and Smalling's contribution claim may only be 
equitably tolled upon a showing of concealment or exceptional circumstances." (R. 636.) 
16 There is one additional point that merits attention: the statute-of-limitations issue was, 
of course, central to the proceedings below. In their briefing and arguments before the 
Retirement Board, Ramsay and Smalling not only failed to raise the GIA as providing a 
statutory discovery rule-they affirmatively represented that the equitable discovery rule 
applies here. (R. 575-83.) 
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III. RAMSAY AND SMALLING FAIL TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF 
PERSUASION ON APPEAL WITH RESPECT TO ACCRUAL OR TO 
ASSIGN ERROR TO THE BOARD'S ACCRUAL FINDINGS. 
Without citation to Utah law, Ramsay and Smalling baldly state that "[i]t could be 
argued that that the statute of limitations for them has not yet begun to run" because they 
have not yet retired. (Appellants' Br. 23.) This Court should not consider that argument, 
because it has not been meaningfully briefed and because Ramsay and Smalling do not 
assign error to the Hearing Officer's findings about accrual. 
A. -Ramsay and Smalling Have Not Meaningfully Briefed the Issue of 
Accrual. 
Ramsay and Smalling's brief does not contain meaningful legal analysis on the 
issue of accrual. A "brief must go beyond providing conclusory statements and fully 
identify, analyze, and cite its legal arguments. Meaningful analysis requires not just bald 
citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on 
that authority." See Hess v. Canberra Dev. Co., 2011 UT 22, il 25, 254 P.3d 161. Here, 
aside from pointing out that an argument about accrual could be made, Ramsay and 
Smalling do not actually argue that it should apply here. (Appellants' Br. 23.) Further, 
Ramsay and Smalling have failed to cite, let alone analyze or apply, any legal authority in 
support of their argument that their retirement claims have not yet accrued. 
Instead, and without discussion or analysis, Ramsay and Smalling cite to Bailey v. 
Shelby County, a Tennessee Court of Appeals decision, for the proposition that 
"[ c ]laimants in similar situations have asserted that claims in connection with retirement 
benefits cannot be brought prior to the actual retirement of the claimant.'' (Appellants' 
Br. 23.) However, while there is no dispute that the claimant in Bailey did assert that his 
claim for retirement benefits did not accrue until the age of retirement, the court rejected 
this argument and held that the plaintiffs claim was barred by the statute of limitations. 
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See Bailey v. Shelby County, No. W2012-1498-COA-R30-CV, 2013 WL 2149734, at *7-
9 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2013). Ramsay and Smalling have not provided meaningful 
analysis on the issue of accrual when all they offer is a case from another state where a 
claimant made a similar argument that was rejected. 
B. Ramsay and Smalling Did Not Assign Error to the Hearing Officer's 
Findings About Accrual. 
With respect to the statute of limitations there is only one issue on appeal: Should 
the applicable statute of limitations been tolled? (Appellants' Br. 6.) Ramsay and 
Smalling have not assigned error to the Retirement Board's express rejection of their 
accrual argument below. (Jd.) 
As they do on appeal, Ramsay and Smalling also argued to the Retirement Board's 
Hearing Officer that it "could be argued" that their claim against the Hospital does not 
accrue until they reach retirement age. (R. 576-77.) The Retirement Board expressly 
rejected this argument for two reasons. 
First, the Retirement Board held that Ramsay and Smalling "are judicially stopped 
from asserting" that their claims against the Hospital for retirement contributions have 
not yet accrued. (R. 634.) The Board found that such an argument "is contrary to the 
position they have taken all along in this case-that they have a right to seek retirement 
contribution payments from the Hospital now."17 (Jd.) 
Second, the Board concluded that even if Ramsay and Smalling were not judicially 
estopped from making this argument, their claim to retirement contributions from the 
17 It bears repeating that Ramsay and Smalling also asserted a right to seek immediate 
relief in the form of retirement contributions from the Hospital in the lawsuit they filed 
against the Hospital and others in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah. (R. 47-
59.) Ramsay and Smalling pursued these claims before the district court, before the Utah 
Court of Appeals, and before the Utah Supreme Court. See Ramsay v. Kane County 
Human Res. Special Serv. Dist., 2014 UT 5, ,r,i 1-6, 322 P.3d 1163. 
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Hospital "has already accrued." (Id) The Board explained that the. "statute of limitations 
begins to run. upon the last act that fonns the basis of the claim. In a claim arising under 
the Retirement Act for retirement contributions against a participating employer, the last 
act that forms the basis of the claim is when the employer does not pay required 
contributions to the State Retirement Office." (Id.) (internal citation omitted) (citing 
Colosimo, 2004 UT App 436, ,r 18). The Board also held that Ramsay and Smalling's 
"argument that a claim for retirement contributions does not accrue until the age of 
retirement contravenes the purpose of the statute of limitations to encourage litigants to 
diligently seek out and file their claims in a timely manner. A ruling that the statute does 
not begin to run until Ramsay and Smalling retire would allow a claimant to sit on a 
claim for decades while interest accrues, documents are lost, memories fade, and 
witnesses pass away." (R. 634-3 5.) 
Because Ramsay and Smalling have not challenged the Retirement Board's rulings 
about judicial estoppel and accrual, this Court should not disturb those rulings. Malloy v. 
Malloy, 2012 UT App 294, ,r 11, 288 P.3d 597 ("In the absence of an adequately briefed 
.argument that a district court's ruling is in error, we will not disturb that ruling."); see 
also In re G.C. v. State of Utah, 2008 UT App 270, ,r 17, 191 P.3d 55 (holding that an 
appellant's failure to challenge the validity of all grounds supporting a decision below 
"essentially conced( es] the validity" of those conclusions). Accordingly, this Court 
should not consider Ramsay and Smalling's theory that it "could be argued" that their 
claims against the Hospital have not yet accrued. 
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IV. ANY DECISION REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 
RETIREMENT ACT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE RETIREMENT 
BOARD, NOT ADDRESSED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Ramsay and Smalling begin at the wrong end of the argument, and they encourage 
the Court to do the same. Before reaching the question of whether their claims are time-
@ barred, they urge the Court of Appeals to issue a "ruling ... that specifically established 
their rights to funding from (the Hospital] for their retirement benefits under the Act." 
(Appellants' Br. 20.) Because the Retirement Board's Hearing Officer never reached this 
question below, even if the Court of Appeals were to reverse on the limitations question, 
the Court should remand all remaining issues to the Retirement Board. However, if the 
Court of Appeals were to consider Ramsay and Smalling's substantive argument 
regarding their rights under the Retirement Act, it should find in the Hospital's favor. 
A. Because the Retirement Board Did Not Address the Interpretation of the 
Retirement Act Below, the Court of Appeals Should Not Address It Here. 
As Ramsay and Smalling concede, the Retirement Board's Hearing Officer did not 
@ reach the issue of the Hospital's alleged liability under the Retirement Act-it based its 
decision entirely on the running of the statute of limitations. (Id. at 18.) That was no 
accident: the Retirement Board made clear that the parties had "asked the [Board] to 
® assume for the sake of argument that the Hospital was an eligible employer under the 
Retirement Act." (R. 561, 633.) Thus, because the Board concluded that Ramsay and 
Smalling's "claim for retirement contributions arising prior to August 11, 2006 is barred 
~ by the statute of limitations," it "decline[ d] to consider the merits of [Ramsay and 
Smalling's] Cross Motion for Summary Judgment," including the argument they raise 
now, that the Hospital is an eligible employer under the Retirement Act. (R. 638.) 
In other words, the statute of limitations "foreclose[ d]" Ramsay and Smalling's 
"cause of action before it [was] ever litigated on its merits." See Federated Capital Corp. 
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v. Haner, 2015 UT App 132, il 17, 351 P.3d 816 (quoting In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 
51, ,r 21, 358 P.3d 1009). Furthermore, because the Retirement Board's decision rested 
solely on statute-of-limitations grounds, the Board did not address any of the Hospital's 
alternative, independent defenses, including standing, !aches and waiver, and the 
Hospital's inability to provide the service-credits remedy that Ramsay and Smalling seek. 
(R. 515-17.) 
The consequence of the Retirement Board's single-issue decision is clear: even if 
the Court reverses the decision regarding the statute of limitations, it should not proceed 
to address the remaining merits of Ramsay and Smalling' s claim. Instead, the Court 
should remand to permit the Retirement Board's Hearing Officer to address the merits. 
Utah precedent dictates this result. In C/G Exploration, for example, the appellant 
and appellee "extensively briefed and argued the merits of the claims," but the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that its review was limited by the decision below-"whether 
the trial court accurately applied the statute of limitations to each claim." CIG 
Exploration, Inc. v. State, 2001 UT 37, ,r 8, 24 P.3d 966. Thus, though the Court would 
"discuss the nature of [the underlying] claims to determine the applicability of the statute 
of limitations," it declined to "decide the merits of either claim." Id. A number of other 
Utah cases stress the importance of remand in circumstances like these, to permit the 
proper decision-maker to pass first on each issue before an appellate court takes up a 
review.ts A remand would be particularly important-and meaningful-here, where the 
ts See, e.g., Hernandez v. Baker 2004 UT App 462, ,I 4, 104 P.3d 664 ("The trial court 
did not address the first two points, despite the parties' arguments. Baker asserts that 
because the trial court did not rule on these points, we should imply that they were met. 
We decline to do so. Instead, we remand this issue to the trial court to make findings and 
rulings."); Crawford v. Tilley, 780 P.2d 1248, 1252 (Utah 1989) ("The final issue plaintiff <i 
has presented on appeal is whether plaintiffs decedent was a common law trespasser on 
defendants' property. The trial judge declined to decide this issue on summary judgment 
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Retirement Board, by its nature, possesses areas of "special competence," including its 
ability to "make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as 
to moot judicial controversies." See Ramsay v. Kane County Human Res. Special Serv. 
Dist., 2014 UT 5, ,r 9, 322 P.3d 1163 (quoting Maverik Country Stores, Inc. v. Indus. 
® Comm 'n, 860 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). Accordingly, the first body to pass on 
this question should be the Retirement Board itself, as the Board's "view of the meaning 
of the terms of the [Retirement] Act, and possibly the manner in which the retirement 
~ fund is administered, is infonnation which a reviewing court might find necessary to have 
to make an informed decision." Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 
1237 (Utah 1980). 
B. If the Court Reaches the Issue of Liability, It Should Hold that the 
Hospital Does Not Owe Any Contributions Under the Retirement Act. 
1. The Hospital is not liable for retirement contributions. 
If the Court reaches the issue of the Hospital's alleged liability under the Retirement 
Act-which it should not-the Court should find that the Hospital is not liable to pay 
retirement contributions under the Retirement Act. Specifically, the Court should hold 
.that liability for contributions under the Retirement Act does not accrue until there has 
been an affinnatiye and knowing admission into URS. Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-202( 4 ). 
"When a construction of [ a statute] will bring it into serious conflict with another 
[statute]," courts have a "duty is to construe the [statutes] to be in harmony and avoid 
conflicts." Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991). Courts have a "duty 
to avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that renders portions of the statute, or related 
and instead based his judgment for defendants on the Landowner Liability Act. We 
therefore remand this case to the trial court to determine the decedent's legal status under 
common law standards of landowner liability."). 
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statutes, meaningless." Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ,r 19 n.5, 5 P.3d_ 616. Furthennore, a 
"court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an 
absurd result or is 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the 
express purpose of a statute.'" Savage v. Utah Youth Viii., 2004 UT 102, ,r 18, 104 P.3d 
1242 (quoting Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Co1p., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996)). 
Ramsay and Smalling set aside these statutory construction concepts and ask this 
Court to adopt a reading of the Retirement }\ct that renders the application and approval 
provisions of the Retirement Act meaningless and leads to an inoperable result. Ramsay 
and Smalling contend that any public employer that offers a retirement benefit to its 
employees becomes a de facto "participating employer" under the Retirement Act-
whether they know it or not-t~e n~oment such alternative retirement benefits are 
offered. In support of this position, Ramsay and Smalling rely on Utah Code Ann. § 49-
13-202(2), which provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
(2) The following employers may be excluded from participation: 
(a) An employer not initially admitted or included as a participating 
employer in this system before January I, 1982, if: 
(i) The employer elects not to provide or participate in any additional 
public or private retirement, supplemental or defined contribution 
plan, either directly or indirectly, for their employees. 
Thus, Ramsay and Smalling conclude that because the Hospital offered a 401 (k) 
plan-a defined contribution plan-it must participate in URS. However, this provision 
is silent concerning when liability for contributions may accrue. 
Accrual of liability for URS contributions is answered by another provision of the 
Retirement Act, which adds to the definition of "participating employer" one that "by 
resolution of its governing body, appl[ied] for admission to the system" and had its 
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application approved by the Board. See Utah Code § 49-13-202(4) (2009). These 
threshold participation requirements were removed from the Retirement Act in 2012, but 
applied at all times relevant to this dispute. See Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-202(3) (2012) 
( adding the phrase "regardless of whether the employer has applied for admission under 
® Subsection ( 4 )"). 
This Court should construe the Retirement Act (at least under the pre-2012 version 
of that Act) in a way that requires a public employer to actually be admitted in URS, 
~ following application to the Board, in order to be defined as a "participating employer" 
under the Retirement Act and before liability for URS contributions begins to accrue.19 
Construing the Retirement Act in this way will give meaning to all provisions and avoid 
4i) the absurd result (as in this case) of an unknowing public employer (the Hospital) racking 
up millions of dollars in alleged liability owed to another public entity (the Board) over a 
span of decades. 
Additionally, construing the Retirement Act to require knowing participation is 
consistent with the express purposes of the Retirement Act to establish a "uniform system 
of membership" and to promote "economy and efficiency in public service." Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-11-103(l)(a)(i), (vi). Ramsay and Smalling would create two classes of 
participating employers: those who are aware of their participation and those who are not. 
19 Prior to the filing of Notice of Board Action in this case, the Board seemed to agree 
that application and admission into URS were necessary prerequisites to becoming a 
participating employer. On February 12, 2007, in light of information it received about 
the Hospital's 401 (k) plan, the Board informed the Hospital for the first time about its 
alleged eligibility to participate in URS. (R. 25.) However, the Board did not contend that 
the Hospital's 40l(k) plan made it a URS participant dating back to the first offering of 
the 401 (k) plan in 1993. Instead, the Board confirmed that the Hospital "must" still 
submit an employer application to the Board "accompanied by a resolution from your 
governing body requesting admission" in URS. (Id.) 
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Participating employers that are aware of their status in URS receive the benefit of 
statutorily mandated education and instruction from the Retirement Board-they are told 
by the Board what their duties are and the manner in which contributions must be paid.20 
However, a public employer that unknowingly becomes a URS participant because it has 
offered some alternative retirement benefit is not treated the same way-the Retirement 
Board does not educate them on their duties and does not instruct on the manner in which 
contributions must be paid. Until its February 12, 2007 letter to the Hospital, the Board 
had not made any effort to educate the Hospital about its alleged obligations under the 
Retirement Act. (R. 25, 36, 637.) A system that allows for both knowing and unknowing 
URS participants, where one group receives education and instruction from the Board 
and the other does not, lacks fairness and unifonnity.21 
Furthermore, as demonstrated by this case, the potential liability that may stack up 
over many years for an unknowing "participant" can be crippling. Before the Hearing 
Officer limited the Retirement Board's claim against the Hospital in this case by the 
statute of limitations, the Board claimed that the Hospital owed more than $7 million 
dollars in delinquent contributions and interest allegedly owed from 1993 to 2009. (R. 
333.) This potential liability threatened the very existence of the only hospital in rural 
Kane County. Such a result is inconsistent with the purpose of the Retirement Act to 
promote economical and efficient public service. 
20 The Retirement Board has a statutory duty to regulate participating employers by 
"educating them on their duties imposed by" the Retirement Act. Utah Code Ann. § 49-
1 l-204(17)(a). The Board must also instruct participants about the "the time, place, and 
manner in which contributions shall be withheld and paid." See id. § 49-11-204( 17)(b ). 
21 It bears noting that the Board discovered the Hospital's 401(k) plan after it took the 
simple act of sending the Hospital a 2 1/2-page questionnaire in 2007. (R. 16-18.) 
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Accordingly, if this issue is reached (which it should not be), this Court should 
construe the Retirement Act in a way that eliminates the notion of de facto and 
unknowing participation and require that liability for contributions does not accrue until a 
public employer has applied for URS participation and been approved by the Board. Utah 
@ Code Ann. § 49-13-202(4). Such a reading does not render meaningless the Retirement 
Act provision relied upon by Ramsay and Smalling-that an employer must participate in 
URS if it provides another fonn of retirement benefit. See Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-
@ 202(2). In such a situation, the Retirement Board may compel a public employer to apply 
and participate in URS. However, liability for contributions should not back-date to the 
adoption of an alternative retirement plan. Again, liability for contributions should only 
@ accrue upon affinnative and knowing acceptance into URS by the Retirement Board. 
Here, by the time the Board filed its Notice of Board Action ( on August 11, 2009), 
the Hospital had already irrevocably elected not to participate in URS. (R. 562.) Thus, the 
Hospital has never applied for, or been admitted by the Board to participate in, URS. 
Accordingly, if the Court reaches the merits of the Hospital's alleged liability, it should 
find that the Hospital is not liable to make retirement contributions in URS. 
2. The Hospital's remedial measures and settlement efforts do not 
establish liability under the Retirement Act. 
Ramsay and Smalling argue that the Retirement Act should be construed based on 
the Hospital's conduct after the Retirement Board demanded that the Hospital pay alleged 
delinquent URS contributions. Specifically, Ramsay and Smalling argue that the Hospital 
somehow admitted that it is a "participating employer" in URS when it sought an 
amendment to the Retirement Act to allow an opt out of URS participation. (See 
Appellants' Br. 18.) However, prior to this action the Retirement Board had taken the 
position that not only must the Hospital pay URS contributions for prior years dating 
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back to 1993, the Board also demanded that Hospital participate forever into the future. 
(R. 4.) Thus, the Hospital elected to opt out of URS-participation not because it agreed 
with the Board's position, but because such an election would cut off its potential liability 
to April 3 0, 2009-the date of its election. This subsequent remedial measure is 
inadmissible to establish liability. See Utah Rules ofEvid. 407. 
Ramsay and Smalling also argue that the Hospital "recognized" its obligations 
under the Retirement Act when it funded retirement contributions during the applicable 
limitations period between 2006 and 2009. (Appellants' Br. 19.) However, the Hospital 
had obtained a grant from the Legislature to assist it in resolving its alleged ( and 
disputed) liability under the Retirement Act. (R. 501.) The Hospital used this grant, 
together with some of its own funds, to negotiate a settlement of this dispute. (Id.) The 
Hospital negotiated a monetary settlement with all but six of the affected employees. (Id) 
To resolve its dispute with the Board, the Hospital applied the balance of its available 
grant money to pay URS contributions allegedly owed during the limitations period to the 
Retirement Board for the six employees who did not settle-including for Ramsay and 
Smalling. (Id) Thereafter, on May 16, 2014, the Board filed a Motion to Dismiss its 
Request for Board Action "because an issues in the Board's request have been resolved 
and the case between the Board and the Hospital is moot." (R. 498.) On June 17, 2014, 
the Hearing Officer granted the Board's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 529.) The Hospital's 
decision to fund URS contributions was made to settle and resolve a dispute-it does not 
constitute an admission of liability. See Utah Rule of Evidence 408. 
In any event, the Retirement Act should not be construed based on the Hospital's 
conduct. Instead, the Retirement Act must be construed based on the text of that Act. 
Accordingly, Ramsay and Smalling's argument that the Hospital's conduct informs a 
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decision on the meaning of the Retirement Act should be rejected. Savage, 2004 UT I 02, 
~ 18 ("It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that this court looks 'first to 
the plain language of the statute' when interpreting meaning."). 
CONCLUSION 
Ramsay and Smalling's claim against the Hospital for URS contributions arising 
prior to August 11, 2006 is time-barred. The limitations period may not be equitably 
tolled because Ramsay and Smalling knew the factual basis of their URS claim-the 
@ Hospital's 40 I (k) plan-for almost 15 years before they intervened in this case. 
Moreover, the Hospital did not conceal any facts from Ramsay and Smalling and there 
are no other exceptional circumstances that could justify equitable tolling. Therefore, the 
@ Court should affirm the Retirement Board's decision to dismiss Ramsay and Smalling' s 
URS claims. 
The Court should not reach Ramsay and Smalling's remaining issues, as they are 
fi either unpreserved, improperly briefed, or beyond the scope of this appeal. 
DATED this 10th day of February, 2016. 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rules 24(a)(ll) and (b)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, no 
addendum is necessary for the foregoing Brief of Appellee. 
1220600.4 
DATED this 10th day of February, 2016. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
By: ~tS {). ~---- --
TimotyC.Houp{ 
Mark . Tolman 
C. Michael Judd 
Counsel for Appellee Kane County Hospital 
44 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing Brief of Appellee contains 
13,635 words, based on the word count of the word processing system used to prepare 
@ this brief, exclusive of table of contents, table of citations, and any addendum containing 
statutes, rules, regulations or portions of the record, and therefore complies with the type-
volume limitation provided in Rule 26(t)(l), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
@ 
@ 1220600.4 
JONES WALDO HOLBROO 
By:d/ {). 
Tim hy C. Houpt 
Mark D. Tolman 
C. Michael Judd 
Counsel for Appellee Kane County Hospital 
45 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of February, 2016, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, two print copies and one electronic copy on CD of the BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES KANE COUNTY HOSPITAL to the following: 
1220600.4 
Brian S. King 
BRIAN S. KING, ATTORNEY AT LAW 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Appellants 
David B. Hansen 
Liza J. Eves 
Howard, Anderson, Hansen & Eves 
560 E. 200 S. #230 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Counsel for Appellee Utah State 
Retirement Systems 
JONES WAL?O HOLBRO~& McDONOUGH PC 
By:~.L,{).~ 
Timqfuy C. Houpt / 
MarU: D. Tolman 
C. Michael Judd 
Counsel for Appellee Kane County Hospital 
46 
